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Exploring the intersections between local knowledge and environmental 
regulation: a study of shale gas extraction in Texas and Lancashire 
 
Abstract 
Contemporary shale gas extraction, also known as “fracking”, has become one of the 
most contentious environmental issues facing Europe and North America.  The advent 
of fracking exposes significant tensions for environmental planning and regulatory 
systems in relation to the scope of unconventional resource extraction.  Academic and 
policy debates have hitherto focused principally on questions related to scientific 
disputes, risk perception, potential health impacts, and the wider economic and geo-
political dimensions to energy security.  This paper draws on extensive qualitative 
research in Texas and Lancashire, undertaken between 2012 and 2015, to explore how 
differing regulatory frameworks are shaped through highly localized discourses that 
include communities opposed to fracking.  Whilst there are significant differences 
between these two examples, including the extent of environmental monitoring, the 
local context remains a pivotal arena within which the regulatory and technical 
dimensions to fracking are being contested and scrutinized.    
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Unconventional hydrocarbon extraction, also known as ‘fracking’, is now one of the 
most contentious issues facing environmental and planning regulation.  It is a stark 
illustration of the capacity for local communities to contest the role of technical 
expertise in environmental decision making.  Major unconventional gas deposits have 
been identified in over 40 countries worldwide, exploratory drilling has taken place in 
Australia, Germany, India, Poland, Romania, and the UK, and commercial extraction 
is now underway in the US, Canada, and China.1 As the “shale gas revolution” has 
spread, however, including the identification of potential new sites in Europe, the 
political dynamics of fracking have become increasingly contentious and uncertain.   
 
The regulation of fracking in the US and the UK has emerged out of strikingly 
different institutional, historical, and technical pathways. Yet in both cases there is 
intense community opposition.  Whilst there is a growing literature exploring 
community mobilization (Briggle, 2015, Willow and Wylie, 2014), less attention has 
been placed on how local residents also become significant actors in the co-
production of locally distinctive regulatory frameworks.  This paper argues that an 
underexplored dimension to the development of shale gas is the role of these localized 
discourses spanning the industry, regulators, and community groups.  We consider 
how local actors shape regulation on the ground through an examination of two 
ostensibly different localities: the US state of Texas, and Lancashire in the north-west 
of England.  
 
Studies of communities opposed to fracking have placed an increasing emphasis on 
assessing the credibility of public perceptions and their capacity to interpret and act 
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upon scientific forms of knowledge (Jaspal and Nerlich, 2014; Jaspal et al, 2014; 
Metze, 2014).  These accounts draw upon traditional viewpoints that separate 
“science” from other forms of knowledge, contributing to hierarchies where scientific 
“experts” are privileged over community or “lay” forms of knowledge. This unhelpful 
binary implicitly suggests that different actors hold more “objective” forms of 
knowledge.  An emphasis on this lay / expert divide can miss the blurred boundaries 
between experts and communities, in an attempt to present certain decisions as 
technical rather than political (see Corburn, 2003, Haughton et al, 2015).  For Andrew 
Feenberg (2010) the paucity of democratic deliberation over science and technology 
marks one of the most critical challenges facing public policy.  The limitations of 
scientific knowledge become underemphasized and are assumed to contain an 
inherent capacity to anticipate localized impacts or guide future policy deliberations 
(see Keller, 2009).  
 
Recent research on the US experience has centred on questions related to scientific 
disputes and risk management.  A key focus has been community negotiation over 
environmental risk and the production of uneven patterns of mitigation and 
compensation (see Howarth et al., 2011; Jacquet, 2014; Schafft et al., 2013).  The 
multiple challenges presented by the development of the industry span environmental, 
geological and economic considerations (see, for example, Boersma and Johnson, 
2012; Brasier et al., 2013; Davis and Hoffner, 2012).  The technological complexities 
of fracking, along with the relatively rapid expansion of the industry, have presented 
barriers for communities seeking to influence debates.  A related body of research, 
from a broadly bio-medical or environmental science perspective, has focused on the 
health and environmental impacts, from an epidemiological and toxicological 
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perspective (see McKenzie et al, 2014; Rabe and Borick, 2013; Spence, 2013).  Given 
the contested nature of community impacts, qualitative studies have started to explore 
the health and social dimensions upon specific communities utilizing ethnographic 
insights (see Finewood and Stroup, 2012; Powers et al, 2014; Willow, 2014; Willow 
and Wylie, 2014).   
 
These US based studies cannot be replicated within Europe given the limited 
development of the fracking industry.  There are limited experiences to date as the 
UK industry has struggled to get local approvals for exploration.  European regulatory 
frameworks have been established, partially as a response to perceived failures in the 
American system and also in response to seismic events in the UK following early 
test fracking (see Boersma and Johnson, 2012, Cairney et al, 2015; Small et al, 2014). 
   
A particular focus has been on competing “storylines” that are based upon 
contradictory claims regarding the specific consequences of the industry (see 
Bomberg, 2015; Cotton et al, 2014; Jaspal and Nerlich, 2014; Jaspal et al, 2014; 
Metze, 2014).  Within the highly contested terrain of fracking, technical forms of 
knowledge produced by industry or governmental actors are given greater credence 
than that produced within communities or activist groups.  Community viewpoints 
cam become cast as unfounded and resistant to scientific and technical forms of 
knowledge (Metze, 2014).  Yet the term “community” should be treated with caution 
in this context as it encompasses a wide range of opinions and dimensions of 
knowledge and expertise.  Whilst there is unlikely to be consensus on industry 
impacts, existing studies further sustain expert and lay accounts of knowledge.  
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Questioning the credibility of public opposition or representing them as “parochial” 
concerns are familiar arguments that emerge during planning disputes.  More 
sympathetic accounts argue that the stigmatization of residents opposing development 
as NIMBYs (not in my backyard) can be a superficial means to discredit opposition to 
development through questioning their motivations (see McClymont and O’Hare, 
2008).  The geographer The examination of large-scale infrastructure projects by 
Susan Owens (2004) explores how notions of a “public interest” dominate planning 
and regulatory systems, particularly in infrastructure decisions.  Clashes with local 
communities can emerge when it is assumed that the rationale for development has 
gained tacit approval.  Similarly, the geographer Karen Bickerstaff’s examination of 
nuclear waste disposal notes that characterizations of communities as obstacles to 
development fail to account for “how people make sense of risk as well as 
constructions of place identity and quality of life” (2012, page 2612).  Bickerstaff 
draws on Doreen Massey’s conceptualization of the relational dimensions between 
space and place to show how “publics form around materially and politically complex 
issues” (2012, page 2614).  These perceptions are based not only on media 
representations, but draw from a multitude of sources including historical planning 
disputes, and shared community histories.  
 
Yet there is an ongoing routine simplification of knowledge that runs through 
planning processes.  Mhari Aitkin’s research examining opposition to wind farms 
notes that planning arenas such as public inquiries create quasi-judicial processes that 
privilege expert knowledge presented in support of the state.   “The public inquiry,” 
as Aitken notes, “is based on an unrealistic – perhaps idealised – vision of science” 
(Aitken, 2009, page 62).   This can be coupled with a process of “recasting non-
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scientists’ problems into scientific terms” (Keller, 2009, page 178) thereby favoring 
these expert participants.  These modes of engaging with knowledge overly simplify 
and ignore the complexities of decision-making through casting community based 
experts as biased but state approved scientific and technical assessments as neutral.  
Examinations of UK flooding, for example, note that attempts to create hierarchies of 
knowledge are dangerous as “dismissing particular forms of knowledge as somehow 
less reliable or valuable miss out on the insights that come from such sources” 
(Haughton et al, 2015, page 377).  Technical expertise also resides within 
communities and how the state “participates in alliances on the ground” (ibid) may 
more useful to explore.   
 
The study of unconventional hydrocarbon extraction provides an opportunity to 
explore emerging alliances as it draws together spatial planning, environmental 
regulation, and local communities within a nexus of technical expertise. Across the 
US there are varying regulatory frameworks and it would be misleading to talk about 
a unified industry given the diversity of individual state practices and the levels of 
power they hold in contrast to a comparatively highly centralized English regulatory 
and planning system.  Texas in particular has developed a significant history of 
regulatory expertise of the oil and gas industry, whilst the UK has only limited 
experience of onshore production with a largely untested regulatory regime (see Small 
et al, 2014; Hilson, 2015).  
Shale gas is one of a series of so-called “unconventional hydrocarbons”, including tar 
sands, that are pivotal to the contemporary utilization of nature by the extractive 
industries.  “To transform kerosene-impregnated rock formations and bitumen-filled 
sands into oilfields,” writes the political scientist Timothy Mitchell in relation to tar 
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sands, “is to acknowledge that what we call nature is a machinated artificial territory 
in which all kinds of novel claims and political agendas can form” (Mitchell, 2011 
page 252).  For those living near to shale gas deposits, the newfound viability of 
fracking has reshaped the relationship between communities and their local 
environments as they become integrated into new energy landscapes.  Feenberg 
challenges the dominant narrative of science and technology as a single linear 
trajectory.  Rather “technical development is not an arrow seeking its target, but a tree 
branching out in many directions” (2003, 79). 
The commercial potential of fracking was established in Texas during the late 1990s 
after nearly two decades of industry development in the Barnett Shale although the 
origins of the technique can be dated back to the early nineteenth century.2   Whilst 
the usage of aspects of fracking has a long history, the proprietary mix of chemicals, 
the scale of water use, and the development of horizontal drilling technologies have 
radically intensified the extractive process with the life cycle of the industry from raw 
materials to waste disposal posing new environmental challenges for communities 
beyond the drilling sites. 3 
 
This paper is based on qualitative fieldwork conducted between 2012 and 2015 in 
Lancashire and Texas. The research draws on qualitative interviews and ethnographic 
insights including attendance at community and industry meetings.  A series of 
twenty-seven semi-structured interviews in Texas (10) and Lancashire (17) were 
conducted with key individuals involved in the fracking industry, land use planning, 
environmental regulation, and community mobilization against fracking. For the 
Lancashire fieldwork the author participated in a series of meetings with a prominent 
anti-fracking group, attending around one event per month during 2012 and 2013, and 
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spoke informally with environmental campaigners, local politicians, state officials and 
representatives of the drilling company and their PR firm.  The Texas fieldwork was 
primarily conducted during the spring and summer of 2014 and included attendance at 
campaign meetings and visits to the Eagle Ford Shale.  The interviews explored the 
motivations for community opposition to fracking and the scope of public influence at 
the local and regional level within regulatory and decision-making frameworks.  
Interviewees discussed their perceptions of the fracking industry, their motivations for 
opposition (if relevant), any history of environmental activism, and their 
understanding of the social and environmental impacts of fracking. 4   
 
We begin with Texas, a state with a long history of oil and gas development where 
commercial fracking has grown in significance since 2005 (Davis, 2012).  Local 
community opposition is increasing as production intensifies and we examine some of 
the responses to the regulation of the industry.  We then turn to Lancashire, the initial 
focus of community opposition to fracking in the UK and a region where full 
commercial extraction has been on pause since May 2011.  In the concluding section 
we reflect on some of the wider conceptual and policy related themes raised by this 
study of the local impacts of fracking. 
 
 
I Texas as centre and model 
Texas is the one of the most significant global producers of shale gas along with 
Pennsylvania, Louisiana, and West Virginia, with three significant reserves located 
and actively drilled within the state.  One of these reserves, the Eagle Ford Shale, is 
now “the largest single oil and gas development in the world based on capital 
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expenditures” (IED, 2013). There are over 2,521 oil and gas producing wells and the 
revenues are estimated in excess of 46 billion USD in total economic impacts for 
2012 in the 14 counties where shale gas is being extracted (see figure one) (TRRC, 
2015).  The Eagle Ford Shale lies directly south of the cities of Austin and San 
Antonio, covering an area of over 3,000 square miles (7,770 square kilometres ) and 
spanning a mix of small towns, rural, and semi-rural areas. 
 
Standards of environmental regulation and monitoring vary between US states.  The 
oil and gas industry is regulated by the Texas Railroad Commission (TRRC) 
including the granting of permits for drilling and operations, and environmental 
oversight.  As mineral rights can be owned by private individuals there is a 
presumption in favour of development if rights owners so choose although there are 
important variations.5  The political scientist Charles Davis notes that “TRRC 
officials insist that fracking operations are safe, adding the caveat that no documented 
evidence exists of groundwater contamination in the 60- year history of frack jobs 
within Texas” (2012, 183).  However, there are a number of environmental exclusions 
from their regulatory remit including road maintenance, noise issues, odor and air 
contaminants, and surface ownership disputes. The Texas Commission on 
Environmental Quality (TCEQ) monitors air quality issues and the Texas Department 
of Transport takes responsibility for road issues.  Unlike states such as Colorado, 
Texas does not require any statutory environmental assessments or wildlife impact 
assessments (see Davis, 2012).  
 
A significant theme emerging from studies of public perceptions of fracking is that 
fear or insufficient public knowledge forms the basis for unsubstantiated concerns 
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(see Jones et al, 2013). Such work can overemphasize scientific certainties and the 
difficulties of predicting or monitoring impacts.  A growing body of ethnographic 
work questions the capacity of the state to monitor and regulate the industry.  
Declining air quality standards have become an issue across the state, not just within 
the shale gas fields.  A major eight-month study of air quality found that within the 
20,000 square miles of the Eagle Ford Shale there were only five permanent air 
monitors raising concerns about the challenges in gathering adequate environmental 
data (Morris et al, 2014).   Texas relies on thousands of the oil and gas sites to audit 
their own emissions, and to notify the TCEQ in the event of a problem (see Briggle, 
2015).   The lack of state capacity to monitor environmental effects means that the 
shale gas industry and the public, including activists have become a vital component 
of the regulatory process.  Even areas such as the city of San Antonio outside the 
commercial fracking zone have been breaching federal air targets (Buchele, 2014).  A 
San Antonio environmental campaigner, noted that “air does not respect city limits” 
(Interview, “Vicky”, March 2014), thereby highlighting the increasingly complex 
nexus of environmental impacts spanning different administrative boundaries, land 
uses, and local communities.  
 
In towns such as Azle, located just north of Fort Worth, local communities have been 
drawn into significant campaigning activity.  Between November 2013 and January 
2014 alone, thirty earthquakes have been recorded in a local area that does not have a 
history of seismic activity.   A town meeting was held in Azle by the Texas Railroad 
Commission in January 2014 to assuage local fears attracted over 800 residents (see 
CBS, 2014; City of Azle, 2014; USGS, 2013).  Seismic activity had not been 
anticipated by the industry as a consequence of fracking and these localized 
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earthquake clusters have served to galvanize public concerns (see Frohlich, 2012).   
As one Texas activist explained: 
The TRRC commission is required to have public meetings and I went in January 
[2014]. Bus loads of people from Azle were bussed in and came to testify about 
the earthquakes they’ve been having from wastewater injections in their town, and 
it was a little bit of this is for show. So they listened, they had to listen!  But it got 
a ton of media attention and that is good for something  
(“Anna”, environmental campaigner, interview, March 2014). 
 
The media attention and evidence from the communities was viewed to have positive 
effects.  In the face of public testimony the Texas Railroad Commission appointed a 
seismologist to investigate the potential relationship between fracking and seismic 
activity due to the lack of nearby monitoring equipment (USGS, 2013).   This study 
found a probable relationship between the injection of fracking wastewater for 
disposal and Azle’s earthquakes, but has since been disputed by the Commission as 
unrelated to shale gas activities (Buchele, 2015).  The political dynamics of how 
scientific studies are interpreted remains underexplored as the focus is often based 
upon disputes over whether studies as “correct” or “incorrect” and are reliant upon a 
unified vision of science. The contention that fracking is safe underpins the regulatory 
framework within Texas and elsewhere and is resistant to more complex 
interpretations of scientific information. 
 
These attempts to keep scientific and technical information outside the realm of 
community deliberation have only been partially achieved. Even seemingly more 
mundane aspects of regulation are mediated between the local state, industry, and 
local communities. Planning and zoning frameworks primarily determine acceptable 
distances from other land uses (see Fry, 2013).  The zoning system coupled with 
privatized mineral rights creates a seemingly standardized regulatory framework 
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facilitating shale gas development but managing localized impacts.  Looking at local 
variations between municipalities reveals a different picture.  Whilst the TRRC allow 
drilling within 200 feet (61 meters) from homes, municipalities have the discretion to 
vary setback sites.   An examination of 26 zoning ordinances in Denton, Texas, found 
that the distances varied between 300 and 1500 feet (about 31 to 457 meters) (Fry, 
2013).  The rationale for these setbacks included public health concerns as well as 
visual impact.  The ordinances also reflect the varying interest groups that were able 
to influence public deliberations.  These differences do not represent technical 
negotiations: “Instead setback distances are highly politicized compromises between 
residents’ concerns about the proximity of gas wells to their homes, mineral owners’ 
rights to profit from gas drilling, and the city council’s fear of legal lawsuits for a 
regulatory undertaking” (Fry, 2013, page 87).     
The US is distinct from the UK (and many other countries) since mineral rights can be 
privately owned rather than automatically being the possession of the state.  Direct 
payments to mineral rights owners per acre, alongside employment in the industry and 
economic opportunities for those supporting it, have major impacts on the local 
economy (see McAllister, 2013). However, benefits are uneven: 
Western [Texas] communities are traditionally some of the poorest.  People are 
impacted differently, some sold [their mineral rights] relatively inexpensively, if they 
had waited a while they would have got paid a whole lot more  
(“Paul”, Engineering professor, interview, March 2014).Some homeowners may only 
own surface rights and simply find themselves obliged to allow drilling on their land, 
as mineral rights take precedence over surface rights. The Railroad Commission’s 
advice is limited in this regard, suggesting that the best strategy for surface rights 
holders is to ensure they purchase at least a portion of the mineral rights and where 
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this is not the case negotiation could be entered into over surface usage and potential 
damage although there is no legal requirement for the mineral right’s holder to do so 
(Texas Railroad Commission, 2014).   
 
Mediating development has been restricted to the immediate vicinity of shale gas 
wells.  However, the expansion of the industry has much wider impacts.  Parts of 
Texas have seen temporary population increases as oil and gas workers receiving 
relatively higher wages move to the area.  Local impacts to the economy are 
significant: 
The Eagle Ford Shale has put such a strain on services that we’ve had to move.  
Going south it was such an influx of all the oil workers coming in, the roads have 
been a huge issue, housing, finding temporary housing, you hear about people 
who have lived in the county, schoolteachers leaving rental property  
(“Monica” economic development officer, interview, March 2014).  
 
Local residents talked about how technological developments meant that the industry 
and associated impacts had intensified during their own lifetime making parts of the 
state unrecognizable.  This landscape is now extensively scattered with well pads, gas 
and oil storage facilities including condensate tanks, solid and wastewater disposal 
sites, and pits in fields adjacent to farmland with grazing cows and other livestock. 
These impacts can only partially be addressed through regulatory practiced focused 
on each specific shale gas well and not the cumulative spatial impact of technologies.  
A changing sense of place has become a catalyst for some forms of community 
opposition.  
 
Critiques of NIMBYism emphasize that development processes often fail to consider 
peoples’ emotional attachment to place sufficiently.  Community opposition may be 
interpreted as a “selfish” desire to halt change but is much more complex with fear 
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and anxiety having material impacts on peoples’ health and well-being.  The rural 
town of Nordheim, located in the Eagle Ford Shale provides such an example. The 
town has just over 300 residents who have been organizing against a permit 
application for nearby waste dumps for fracking waste.  The operator, Pyote, did not 
have to inform Nordheim’s mayor as it is directly outside the city limits and not 
subject to their zoning ordinances. One long-term Texan resident described the 
impacts upon her: 
Of course it [the Pyote waste disposal site] worries me… I have a hard time going 
to sleep, let’s put it that way. But who cares? Most of the people feel that they 
can’t do anything and that’s why they haven’t.  They feel defeated from the 
beginning. They believe that the oil and gas industry rules the TRRC (Texas 
Railroad Commission)  
(“Rose”, local resident, interview, March 2014). 
 
Local residents of Nordheim and campaigners expressed a sense of distrust towards 
the Texas Railroad Commission’s relationship with the industry. Interviewees also 
referred to a history of the oil and gas industry and “wildcatting” (unregulated 
drilling).  Regulation was not understood not the outcome of top-down state power 
but described by “Rose”, whose family had owned a farm for three generations, as 
battle between communities, regulators and less responsible industry operators.  
Two of the interviewees were part of families living in the local area for generations 
drew upon a more historical and locally situated knowledge of the area and 
expressed a sense of loss for the landscapes they loved.  Their opposition to the 
waste disposal site was complex but also included a historical knowledge of the 
specific traits of the location including periods of flooding at the proposed site.  This 
would have damaging consequences to adjacent agricultural land and further 
sustained a view that the TRRC’s limited knowledge of the spatial impacts of their 
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decisions overlooked the possibilities of hybrid forms of knowledge that integrated 
community experiences.  
 
The Texan case problematizes the existing literature on community opposition to 
development for several reasons.  Texan resident groups have been important actors 
in identifying areas of concern in order to monitor, regulate, or challenge the shale gas 
industry.  Their opposition emerge from the lived experiences of environmental 
change and reveal the limited technical capacity of regulators to anticipate and 
monitor impacts. These collaborations pose a challenge to interpret community 
concerns in more nuanced ways.  Public engagement has been pivotal in assisting 
with basic data collection.  In parts of the state communities have actively petitioned 
for technical and scientific studies or been involved in collecting data themselves.  
Grassroots monitoring and reporting of seismic activity is now actively encouraged by 
the US Geological Survey.  These actions illustrate that complexities of community 
resistance cannot be understood solely as unsubstantiated opposition and do not not 
necessarily indicate withdrawal from local regulation. The data on earthquakes, for 
example, is being actively co-produced within communities and reflect desires to 
participate in more democratic forms of science and decision-making. 
 Examples from Texas show how different tiers of the state have acted upon public 
concerns and together they have demonstrated a range of environmental impacts.   
 
Given the important role of Texas in the development of the oil and gas industry 
many aspects of fracking represent a local technology developed to suit its specific 
geologies, engineering expertise, and land rights framework. Although the fracking 
industry now operates in many states, local assumptions, regulatory procedures, 
 16 
technical infrastructures, and geological conditions have been key factors influencing 
the scale and success of operations. The limited environmental role of the Texas 
Railroad Commission (TRRC) along with their public commitment to the oil and gas 
industry have created favourable conditions for industry development.  However,  
 
II Lancashire as experimental field 
The county of Lancashire in north west England has been  at the forefront of 
European attempts to develop a viable shale gas industry.  Onshore oil extraction in 
the UK has been in production since the 1973 discovery of the Wytch Farm oil basin, 
the largest onshore oil field in Europe (BGS and DCLG, 2011).  However, the UK 
industry has limited experience of onshore gas exploration.  The nascent location of 
the industry means that it has more impact upon residential areas than many parts of 
the USA, as the principal shale deposits are located beneath inhabited areas and near 
to major conurbations (Hilson, 2015). 
 
The UK state apparatus is highly centralized, most recently the Conservative-led 
coalition government abolished regional tiers of government in 2010 (see Sandford, 
2013).6   UK Regulation involves national and local tiers of government and a number 
of agencies including environmental regulation through the Environment Agency, a 
non-departmental publicly funded body (see House of Commons, 2006).  These 
bodies are all critically important but the main focus of public interaction is the local 
state.  Lancashire County Council, the local planning authority for minerals, convenes 
a planning committee composed of locally elected politicians to decide upon 
applications for well pads in the area.  
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Since 2009 the Staffordshire based Anglo-American-Australian fracking company 
Cuadrilla have applied for planning permission to drill on sites in the region 
encompassed by a Petroleum Exploration Development Licence.  This covers an area 
of approximately 436 square miles (1130 square kilometres) in Lancashire’s 
Bowland-Hodder Shale, extending west of Preston to as far north as Blackpool (see 
figure 2).  Cuadrilla claim that this shale deposit potentially contains 125 trillion cubic 
feet of shale gas, making it by far the UK’s most significant unconventional gas 
reserve based on the British Geological Survey’s calculations (Andrews, 2013). 6 
 
Sites spanning the Ribble estuary in Lancashire have been identified by Cuadrilla for 
exploratory drilling catalyzing local opposition to each site in turn.  Banks, a small 
settlement located in a semi-rural area some forty miles north-west of Manchester and 
25 miles north of Liverpool has been a centre for opposition.  The first local group 
was started by “ten local residents meeting one evening” (“Irene”, Interview, 
September 2012).  Erroneously dismissed as “the desolate north east” in a UK 
Parliament debate on fracking, this region is in fact densely populated.7  The area 
supports a significant population who travel daily from this rural location to 
employment in major urban centres, it has a well-established market gardening 
industry, and there are numerous farms supplying major retailers.  The Ribble Estuary 
National Nature Reserve is managed by Natural England (the statutory agency 
responsible for the natural environment).  
 
The development of the shale gas industry came as a surprise to many local residents 
with several recounting the first glimpse of the industry when they “looked out of a 
window” and saw well pads being constructed in an agricultural field (“James”, 
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Interview, September 2012).  From the outset interviewees referred to numerous 
occasions they had tried to find out information from Lancashire County Council or 
their local politicians with limited success. The lack of perceived transparency set a 
context within which activism started to emerge, not least as an attempt to check the 
perceived pro-industry approach of the UK government.  Communities started to 
question the political context in which these decisions were being discussed.  Whilst 
the local politicians ultimately rejected latter applications for exploratory drilling, this 
was against the strong advice of officers.  These decisions have now been called in by 
central government.  These disputes within the local state itself reveal further 
problems in creating an expert / lay binary between the state and communities.  The 
difficulties of understanding the potential impacts of shale gas within Lancashire 
extended across the industry, the local state, and community groups. The local 
planning officers instead of engaging with uncertainties were seen as highly defensive 
by interviewees.  
 
When DECC [Department of Energy and Climate Change] issues PEDL 
[Petroleum Exploration Development licence] licences in 2008 no-one in the UK 
knew what fracking was [We had] no concept of tonnes of chemicals and millions 
of gallons of freshwater at very high pressures generated by diesel.  Even the local 
authority didn’t see a need for environmental oversight  
(“Margaret”, local resident, interview, July 2012). 
 
The early stages of the process was described as a learning process for all actors. A 
lack of understanding of the implications of a commercial industry spanned public 
perceptions, the emergent shale gas industry itself, and different tiers of government 
with increasing efforts being made to improve nascent regulations.  
These residents did not consider themselves to be environmental campaigners from 
the start.  Instead, most of the interviewees had wanted further information about the 
fracking process following Cuadrilla’s local planning applications. The local planning 
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authority’s approach can be understood be a contributing factor in increasing local 
opposition.  The chair of a more recently established resident’s group who had no 
history of environmental activism said: 
We’ve gone from not really knowing what fracking was then wanting to know 
more about it, to wanting to find out about it.  Not being anti-fracking initially 
then realising what fracking would do to our community and being very angry 
about it and then realising the wider implications from climate change and what 
this is going to do to the UK.   
(“Jules”, local resident, interview, January 2015) 
 
The local planning authority appeared to adopt a top-down view of shale gas 
extraction as manageable within existing forms of regulation. They gave far greater 
weight to the commercial operator’s usage of technical and scientific information than 
to community viewpoints and experts particularly at latter stages of the planning 
process.  Scientific and technical knowledge, rather than a basis for deliberative 
discussion, became a means of marginalizing community concerns. These processes 
raised critical questions about the capacity of the local planning system to adequately 
mediate between realms of expertise and differing forms of knowledge.   
 
Opposition mobilized significantly following early test drills and fracks at Preese 
Hall, Blackpool.  Cuadrilla’s use of hydraulic fracturing at this site created wider 
public attention when test drilling and a series of six fracks triggered two seismic 
events and compromised well integrity, leading to a  moratorium on exploration from 
the end of May 2011 until mid December 2012 (Green et al. 2012).  Further 
complexities later emerged as the UK Environment Agency permitted disposal of 
waste water from the first exploratory fracks into the Manchester Ship Canal contrary 
to US industry best practice (BBC, 2014; Rodriguez and Soeder, 2015). Following 
this the UK government commissioned the Royal Society (2012) to report on the 
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seismic events and make a series of recommendations to strengthen industry 
regulation. The report strengthened consensus between the state and regulators and 
was used as a mechanism to try and increase public confidence.  Yet such statements 
did little to allay the fears of many local residents in Lancashire and raised concerns 
regarding the viability of living and working in the area if the industry expanded.8   
Attending local resident meetings it was clear that the inability to anticipate these 
small earthquakes had increased mistrust in Cuadrilla and industry regulation.  These 
events formed part of an evolving community narrative that further disputed that 
scientific expertise lay with the state or the industry given the chain of events.  
 
The local planning process rather than mediating a debate to incorporate an 
increasingly engaged public, retreated into a technical process that valorized highly 
technical presentations of information as a mechanism to overcome local concerns. 
Instead further opposition was catalyzed.  Cuadrilla’s planning applications reveal a 
wealth of technical information spanning engineering, environmental, noise 
abatement, traffic flows, and wildlife issues.  There are glaring asymmetries in the 
resources available to prepare systematic forms of evidence for communities 
opposing fracking.  The production of evidence to support the industry case ran into 
thousands of pages and planning committee meetings took place over several days.  
The total number of representations, primarily objections to the most recent two sites 
is estimated at 30,000, and constitute the largest number of public comments ever 
received for a Lancashire planning application (The Blackpool Gazette, 2015).  
 
Local resident groups started to offer presentations to the public as well as different 
tiers of local government based on interpretations of varying forms of evidence. They 
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started to look further afield to local residents’ accounts in Texas and Pennsylvania 
becoming concerned about a range of environmental issues such as groundwater 
contamination, traffic, and noise. Through seeking to incorporate situated accounts 
within the debate, local communities problematized the expert / lay divide, working to 
develop hybrid forms of knowledge.  Making connections to other communities was 
an important means to try and understand the daily consequences of development, and 
these fine grained accounts are often overlooked within technical assessments that 
attempt to generalize local impacts, underestimating their cumulative effects upon 
quality of life (see Corburn, 2003).   
 
There are also consequences for communities when they express fears that may later 
go on to be disputed.  Ongoing US studies show that fracking is unlikely to cause 
earthquakes but disposal of wastewater probably does.  Nonetheless, because these 
fears were an early focus of opposition they contributed to a discourse that is sceptical 
of local communities fears as lacking credibility, underemphasizing the continually 
developing understanding of the industry (see Bomberg, 2015). 
 
The UK government lifted the moratorium on fracking in December 2012 following 
political pressure (DECC, 2014).10   
As in the case of Texas, communities were concerned about the pro-industry stance of 
government and regulators.  Residents talked about Lancashire County Council as 
being under intense pressure to allow fracking to go ahead.  The idea of public 
interest or energy security was disputed by interviewees who saw the industry as 
being “forced” upon them. 9 The uncertainties raised through the necessity of seismic 
monitoring itself has negative consequences for some local residents.  The mere 
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presence of this equipment, for example, has the potential to depress land values as 
well as foster community anxieties.  As one Lancashire campaigner explained:  
We had a lot of meetings [but] the National Farmers Union and growers are very 
cautious because if there is a loss of confidence in the area then [it is] worth 
millions [of pounds] to them   
(“Ivan”, local campaigner, interview, April, 2012).  
 
Some examinations of public participation suggest that planners see themselves as 
representing a silent consensus in the face of “NIMBYs” who form a vocal minority 
(Bell et al, 2005, Clifford, 2013).  In this case a number of agricultural and tourist 
kept silent because images of a rural and safe environment underpinned their 
continuing success.   
 
An “idealized” view of science dominated the public consultation process.  Technical 
and scientific questions raised by local residents became discounted as the planning 
applications were considered and officials saw only their “experts” as reliable in 
contrast to independent scientists who worked with communities.  An interesting 
divergence with other research is that communities neither started to internalize the 
local state’s construction of expert forms of knowledge nor sought to present their 
claims only through the prism of local knowledge (Aitken, 2009; Haughton et al, 
2015).  The residents attempted to integrate an expanded definition of expertise or 
hybrid knowledge including the lived experiences of communities in the US.  Whilst 
some concerns were discounted, objections regarding traffic, noise, and other local 
impacts played a large part in informing the decision-makers to reject later well-pad 
sites.  Scientific knowledge is pivotal to developing new technologies but the narrow 
focus of the planning process obscures the uncertain and locally specific conditions of 
operation and development.  The anxieties and fears of communities were seen as 
 23 
extraneous to outside experts supporting development.  The possibilities of co-
constructing knowledge between the different interest groups remained unrealized. 
 
Political dimensions of the debate have become subjugated to a technical planning 
process unable to consider critical dimensions of the debate.  They are less willing to 
engage with them on more scientific or technical issues.   The planning process itself 
has now become challenged as an inadequate mechanism to assess the potential 
impacts of a British shale gas industry.  The emergence of nearly 200 local groups 
opposed to fracking within the UK points to discontent with the current planning 
system as insufficiently equipped to mediate different spheres of knowledge.   
 
Although the UK government and industry suggest that they will learn from the US 
experience, the different geological, institutional, and regulatory context poses 
uncertainties beyond the current scope of scientific knowledge. Whilst communities 
have sought to raise objections through the planning process, the lack of discretion 
exercised by the local planning authority constrains the possibility of local residents 
making a greater contribution to energy debates.  State regulators engage with 
communities when they focus on specific local environmental disturbances such as 
noise from overnight works or truck movements, or the visual amenity of the area. 
Lancashire County Council do not have the jurisdiction to ban fracking in any area or 
to consider opposition to fracking activities per se or the climate change implications 
(DCLG, 2013, 2014). Whilst a regulatory framework is emerging there is limited 
consideration of reducing local impacts.  This reflects the ambiguity between the 




The production of knowledge in relation to hydrocarbon extraction has developed 
through technical and scientific advances that are embedded within distinctive local 
experiences and how different facets of community mobilization.  “Energy” in this 
context is not a compliant entity to be extracted but requires a medley of different 
technologies and institutional structures to enable its material utilization.  The 
utilization of shale gas is not pre-determined but a contested field spanning industry, 
the state, and a plethora of environmental organizations.   Technological and scientific 
dimensions of regulation cannot be meaningfully confined to a sphere outside 
community engagement (see Cowell and Lennon, 2014; Keller, 2009).   The cases 
illustrate that knowledge is not solely captured through top down regulation but 
within the interactions between communities, state agencies, and industry operators.  
Without a more fruitful engagement with the politicized nature of technology it 
becomes difficult for local communities concerns to be registered as useful 
contributions to the shale gas debate.   
 
In the case of fracking, uncertainties prevail at every level from geological data to 
locally experienced anxieties. Estimates of shale gas reserves, for example, vary 
widely with the British Geological Survey estimates using less accurate 
methodologies than the US Geological survey due to lack of well production data (see 
Andrews, 2013).  Between 20 and 40 wells will have to be test “fracked” in the UK 
order to assess commercial production and thus requires political action to facilitate 
further technical data (see Erbach, 2014). 
  
 25 
The UK government’s political rhetoric has suggested that fracking relies on the 
simple transference of technological innovation.  Yet the idea of “transplanting” an 
industry involves far more than the movement of objects such as drilling rigs or the 
routine application of existing technical knowledge but extends to wider implications 
for institutions, regulatory practices, and the social and political dynamics of local 
communities.  The collective experiences of seismic activity, whether in Azle or 
Blackpool, demonstrate how communities have been pivotal in directing further 
research into the effects of the industry.  Regulation has been shown to be a much 
more complex set of processes mediated through localized discourses.  
 
Statutory environmental and planning regulation is situated within a nexus of private 
commercial interests, political imperatives, and local concerns.  The ways in which 
knowledge becomes transformed through these processes provide an important focus 
for understanding tensions creating by shale gas extraction.  The study of shale gas 
extraction requires a more nuanced understanding of how specific forms of technical 
and scientific knowledge are generated, interpreted, and applied across different 
spatial contexts.  Whilst scientific knowledge exists within political and social 
situations the response to the highly politicized fracking debate is often recourse to 
further scientific studies to resolve disputes.  These are framed as processes that may 
verify or disprove community concerns rather than substantively engage with the 
inevitable impacts upon places.  Communities’ interests become framed as parochial 
as they are pitted against more abstract ideas of “energy security” that presume a 
knowable public interest is formulated at national tiers of government.   
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Fracking is not merely the application of technical expertise but extends to the 
discretion and power of regulators, the reach of environmental monitoring, and the 
capacity for community action.  In Texas, communities experiencing the impact of 
fracking have revealed the limited scientific resources in place to measure impacts of 
seismicity or air quality.  There are critical gaps in the evidence base upon which 
technical decisions are based.  We are now witnessing new forms of direct 
engagement in Texas spurred by the unanticipated environmental impacts of the 
industry.  Similarly, in Lancashire, community concerns have spilled over into wider 
debates that cannot be contained within existing planning processes.  The 
development of a British anti-fracking movement demonstrates, in part, a 
dissatisfaction with the limitations of current regulatory processes that held within the 
confines of traditional notions of expertise and not open to wider public engagement.  
 
The scaling up from local to global concerns challenges notions that resident based 
groups are solely concerned with their locality and unselectively utilize issues to 
object to the shale gas industry (see Bomberg, 2015).  Such opposition creates risks 
for communities who become labelled as promoting “bad” forms of participation 
(McClymont and O’Hare, 2008).  The conceptual helpfulness of seeing certain forms 
of participation as unwelcome is increasingly disputed.  Further exploration of the 
underpinning motivations for community resistance shows how planning decisions 
insufficiently engages with the complexities of place (Devine-Wright, 2013) and fail 
to explore the deficiencies of a democratic process that rely on outmoded models of 
scientific knowledge (Feenberg, 2010). 
 
 27 
Yet it is the local arena within which some of the most effective forms of public 
scrutiny of this industry have emerged.  Whilst communities cannot command the 
resources of regulatory authorities or industry, they are not naïve groups blindly 
reacting to “objective” technical or scientific knowledge.  For the affected residents in 
both Texas and Lancashire, these emerging dynamics of community mobilization now 
form part of an expanding network of activism and environmentalism in the face of 
new global patterns of resource extraction.  Rather than simplifying narratives of 
community opposition there are opportunities to reflect on how space is being created 




The evidence from the US indicates that the regulatory and environmental challenges 
will more directly affect communities if fracking is extended to more densely 
populated regions such as Lancashire in the UK.   
The experience of fracking highlights the limitations to public deliberation over 
technical data in scenarios where environmental regulation is highly politicized.  In 
particular, the regulatory implications of a highly dispersed extractive industry, 
utilizing a range of new techniques and technologies, raise new challenges for those 




1.  The US Environmental Information Agency (2013) “Technical recoverable shale 
oil and shale gas resources: An assessment of 137 shale formations in 41 countries 
outside the United States” estimates the largest unproved shale gas recoverable 
resources outside the US lie in France, Poland, the Former Soviet Union, Mexico, 
China Algeria and South Africa. Technological developments in oil and gas 
extraction, particularly since the late 1990s, have revived the onshore oil industry 
across parts of North America, contributing towards an economic boom in some 
states, and leading to a significant reduction in energy prices.  Factors that contribute 
to the reduction in US consumer energy prices include the difficulties in exporting 
shale gas.  Considerable efforts are now being made to construct liquefaction plants 
for export with the aim of increasing profits (see Stevens, 2010).  However, there is 
instability in the shale gas market and variation in pricing. See Hilaire et al (2015) for 
a more detailed analysis 
 
2. We can trace its roots back far further with some dating it back to gunpower 
experiments in the mid 19th century or the 1947 “Hydrafrac” in Kansas (see Morton, 
2013).  The term “fracking” encompasses exploration for a range of hydrocarbon 
resources including so called “wet’ and “dry” gas and to a more limited extent oil (see 
Glass, 2011).   
 
3.  The process referred to as fracking seeks to release gas trapped in shale rocks 
through micro-scale shattering or “fracturing” of rock formations, but this is only one 
part of the extraction process. Key technical dimensions involve drilling a series of 
horizontal wells at depth from a principal vertical well and the stimulation of gas 
release through the application of millions of gallons of water at high pressure.  The 
water used in the process is mixed not only with sand—to forcibly hold rock fissures 
open —but also some 500 different chemical compounds to further intensify 
extraction and boost levels of profitability.  Gas (and oil) is returned to the surface 
along with large quantities of wastewater containing fracking fluids whilst the 
remaining water is trapped underground (see Finewood and Stroup, 2012; Howarth et 
al, 2011; Jacquet, 2014).  In the US, the exact composition of the fracturing fluids 
used by different companies varies depending on specific geological conditions but 
the precise identity of these added chemical components enjoys commercial 
confidentiality since the so-called “Halliburton loophole”, enacted by the US federal 
government in 2005, to exempt fracking from federal regulation (see EPA, 2014).  
The legislation excludes “the underground injection of fluids or propping agents 
(other than diesel fuels) pursuant to hydraulic fracturing operations related to oil, gas, 
or geothermal production activities’’ from regulatory oversight on the grounds of 
commercial confidentiality for private operators (Environmental Protection Agency, 
2014, “Regulation of hydraulic fracturing under the Safe Water Drinking Act”).  
However, a number of producers disclose the chemical makeup of fracking fluids.  
The “Fracfocus” website gathers a registry of chemicals and an extensive list of 
companies provide this information under regulation or voluntarily 
(www.fracfocus.org). The key factor underpinning the commercial viability of 
fracking has been rising energy prices from conventional fuel sources.  Although 
individual wells cost between 4 and 10 million USD, and experience a typical fall in 
production of over 80% within three years, the relative costs of different energy 
sources have recently enabled fracking to become highly profitable across parts of the 
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USA (see Oxburgh, 2014).  Since the early 2000s the industry has grown significantly 
in Texas, West Virginia, North Dakota, Wyoming, and Pennsylvania, with 
commercial interest now extending to Colorado, Illinois, Michigan, and several other 
states. 
 
4.   Interviews were transcribed by the author and coded for key themes including 
effectiveness of regulation, personal motivations for opposition, and perceived 
impacts of fracking.  Pseudonyms are used for interviewees throughout the paper. 
 
 
5.  US mineral rights are complex and differ from many other countries such as the 
UK.  US mineral rights can be privately owned.  Mineral and surface rights can be 
“severed” meaning that a homeowner may not own the subsurface.  Federal 
government and government agencies can also own mineral rights.  See Rahm D 
(2011) for more detail on Texas. 
 
6.  Cuadrilla were granted their first onshore PEDL licence during the 13th Onshore 
Licensing Round concluded in May 2008. A total of 93 licences were granted to 54 
companies (Deloitte, 2008). 
 
7.  Lord Howell referred to the “desolate North East” during a UK House of Lords 
debate on fracking.  He later clarified he was thinking of the Lancashire coast in the 
North West, which he goes on to describe as ideal for fracking since “we want the 
derricks for fracking to be far away from residences in unloved areas that are not 
environmentally sensitive.”  He further noted that affluent West Sussex is an “odd” 
place to consider fracking.  “Lord Howell interview: the irony is that I go to the North 




8.  Various recommendations made in the wake of the seismic events including a 
detailed traffic light monitoring system where seismic arrays will closely monitor any 
induced seismicity and shut down operations over a certain level of seismic activity 
attest to detailed planning to facilitate full commercial production.  Further 
controversy has emerged following a Freedom of Information request showing close 
relationships between industry and regulators in supporting shale gas development.  
See DECC (2014). 
 
9.  A Freedom of Information request showed that George Osborne, Chancellor of the 
Exchequer was involved in efforts to “fast-track” fracking including offering central 
government support to the Lancashire County Council. See Guardian, 26 January 
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